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ON THE PERFORMANCE OF HYPERELLIPTIC CRYPTOSYSTEMS N.P. SMART
Abstract. In this paper we discuss various aspects of cryptosystems based on hyperelliptic curves. In particular we c o v er the implementation of the group law on such curves and how to generate suitable curves for use in cryptography. This paper presents a practical comparison between the performance of elliptic curve based digital signature schemes and schemes based on hyperelliptic curves. We conclude that, at present, hyperelliptic curves o er no performance advantage over elliptic curves.
Elliptic curve cryptosystems are now being deployed in the real world and there has been much w ork in recent y ears on their implementation. A natural generalization of such s c hemes was given by Koblitz 12 , who described how the group law on a Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve can be used to de ne a cryptographic system. Almost all of the standard discrete logarithm based protocols such as DSA and El Gamal have elliptic and hyperelliptic variants. This is because such protocols only require the presence of a nite abelian group, with a large prime order subgroup, within which the basic group operation is easy whilst the associated discrete logarithm problem is hard. We shall not discuss these protocols in this paper since everything that can be said for elliptic curve based protocols can usually be said for hyperelliptic curve based protocols. Instead we shall concentrate more on the underlying group: In particular how one performs the group operation and how one produces groups of the required type.
The Jacobian of a genus g hyperelliptic curve will have roughly q g points on it, where q denotes the number of elements in the eld of de nition of the Jacobian. By choosing hyperelliptic curves of genus greater than one we can achieve the same order of magnitude of the group order with a smaller value for q when compared with elliptic curve based systems which have g = 1. This has led some people to suggest that hyperelliptic curves may o er some advantages over elliptic curves in some special situations. For example if we wanted to only perform arithmetic using single words on a 32-bit computer we could choose g = 5 or 6 to obtain group orders of around 160 to 192 bits.
One has to be a little careful as to how large one makes g, since for large genus there is a sub-exponential method to solve the discrete logarithm problem 1 . However this does not appear to a ect the security of curves of genus less than 10 over eld sizes of around 32 bits.
In this paper we give a n o v erview of the group law on a curve of genus g in arbitrary characteristic. We shall give a more e cient reduction method than the standard method of Cantor 3 . This is an immediate extension of the method of Tenner reduction from 19 . We shall then describe various techniques for generating hyperelliptic curves for use in cryptography.
Finally we report on an actual implementation of a hyperelliptic digital signature algorithm. We will conclude that hyperelliptic systems, with current algorithms, are more e cient in characteristic two but appear to o er no practical advantage over elliptic curve systems.
1 X; simultaneously vanish. We shall always assume that the curve C is nonsingular.
In odd characteristic elds we will always assume that H X = 0, whilst in even characteristic elds we will assume that H X = 1, for reasons which will become clear later. Notice that if H X = 1 then in characteristic two any c hoice for the polynomial F X will give rise to a non-singular curve.
The above representation gives rise to a so called`imaginary' quadratic function eld. It is given this name since there are no units of in nite order and the arithmetic in the Jacobian closely mirrors the arithmetic one uses for the class group of an imaginary quadratic number eld.
We can also de ne a hyperelliptic curve of genus g to be given by an equation, like that above but, with deg F = 2g + 2 . This gives rise to à real' quadratic function eld. It is easy to see that, unlike the number eld situation, an imaginary quadratic function eld can be viewed as a real quadratic function eld after making a change of variables. However, just as in the case of the class group of real quadratic number elds, the arithmetic in the Jacobians of real quadratic hyperelliptic curves is more involved and requires the use of`infrastructure'. The reader should consult 18 for an explanation of the algorithms required and 19 for a complexity analysis of the two situations. For the rest of this article we will concentrate on the imaginary quadratic representation, which is more suited to e cient implementations in practice.
Following Cantor and Koblitz, an element of the Jacobian of Note that a 3 will have degree at most 2g and hence a 3 ; b 3 will most probably need to be reduced. We shall return to this later. Notice, however, that for cryptography the most important composition step is doubling, where a 1 = a 2 and b 1 = b 2 . This is because in discete logarithm based systems we wish to perform a multiplication operation on the Jacobian. Using window techniques this involves mainly the doubling of elements rather than a general composition. Hence it is important that doubling an element can be accomplished e ciently.
With our above c hoice of curves in odd and even characteristic we nd:
Doubling in odd characteristic elds. Since 3 . This is much simpler than the odd characteristic step and contributes to much faster times for the verifying of messages using curves over even characteristic elds, see below for details.
We shall now describe the reduction step, which given the result a 3 ; b 3 o f a composition will return an element, a; b, of the Jacobian with deg a g.
The element a 3 ; b 3 represents an element in the group of divisors. Since we are in an imaginary quadratic situation every divisor class and so every element in the Jacobian can be represented by a unique, so called reduced, divisor. The reduction step takes the divisor represented by a 3 ; b 3 and returns the unique reduced divisor a; b in the same divisor class as a 3 ; b 3 . As mentioned above we use a variant of Tenner reduction which is more e cient than the method given by Cantor and Koblitz. In 6 the extended Euclidean algorithm is analyzed in the context of hyperelliptic cryptosystems. As we h a v e already pointed out for even characteristic elds for the most important operation, point doubling, no extended Euclidean algorithm is required. Most of the e ort in performing a sign or verify operation is in the reduction step. Hence analysing the reduction step is far more important, luckily this has already been done in 19 , where it is shown that the above reduction step takes 12g 2 + Og eld operations.
Curve Generation
As in the case of elliptic curves there are many ways one could theoretically proceed if one wanted to produce curves suitable for use in cryptography. In theory the order of jJF q j can be computed in polynomial time using methods due to Adleman, Huang and Pila, see 2 and 20 . These methods are generalizations of the method of Schoof 23 which is used in the elliptic case. Currently there is no implementation of this method for genus greater than one, since the algorithm, although easy to understand, appears very hard to implement.
One of the problems in the hyperelliptic situation is that there is no known analogue of the improvements of Atkins and Elkies to the Schoof algorithm. This means that only the`naive' Schoof algorithm is available in genus greater than one. Such an algorithm appears hopeless as a method, since the`naive' Schoof algorithm is far too ine cient e v en for elliptic curves.
The fact that it seems unlikely that anyone can compute the order of J F q for a general curve of genus 5 or 6 could lead one to propose that one should not worry. For example, if I do not believe that someone can compute the order of J F q then I do not need to worry about many of the attacks on such systems, since most attacks such a s P ohlig-Hellman require knowledge of the group order. This of course also means that our protocols need to be changed so that they do not require knowledge of the group order. Although this is a possible approach, it is to be rejected as it is assumes that someone will not make a known polynomial time algorithm run e ciently. Our security is therefore not built on the di culty of some underlying mathematical problem but on the di culty of programming a known algorithm e ciently.
One can compute hyperelliptic curves using an analogue of the CM method for elliptic curves. This has been worked out in detail for the case of g = 2 in 28 . This method uses the class numbers of quartic CM elds, which are complex quadratic extensions of real quadratic elds. One has of course to insist that the class numbers are small, and hence the curves which are produced will in some sense be`special'. In the CM method for hyperelliptic curves multi-variable analogues of the Hilbert polynomial are constructed, the roots of which modulo p gives the j-invariants of the curve. The curve is then recovered from its j -invariants.
The problem with this technique and the reason it only applies in genus two is that the j-invariants of a hyperelliptic curve h a v e only been worked out for genus less than three. The invariants used are the Igusa Invariants 11 which are linked to the classical 19th Century invariants of quintic and sextic polynomials. After the demise of classical invariant theory at the end of the 19th Century the drive to compute invariants of the higher order quantics, as they were then called, died out. Even today with the advent o f computer algebra systems this seems a daunting task. One way around this problem, which still uses CM, is to use reductions of hyperelliptic curves de ned over Q which h a v e global complex multiplication, see 4 . However, here one is restricting to an even more special type of hyperelliptic curve than the general CM method above.
Another technique is to use the theory of the modular curves, X 0 N, see 8 and 15 . Such curves are well studied and much is known about them. This enables us to compute the orders of the Jacobians of such curves in a much easier way than other general curves. However, paranoid readers should beware since they are well understood curves with special properties they may be susceptible to some new attack which makes use of the fact that they are modular.
Koblitz, in 13 , suggests using curves of the form v 2 + v = u n ; over some nite prime eld F p . Given such curves he then gives a procedure to determine the group order by e v aluating a Jacobi sum of a certain character. We refer the reader to Koblitz's book for details. However once again we are restricting to a v ery special type of curve which m a y be susceptible to some, as yet unknown, attack.
In characteristic two one can use curves de ned over sub elds 12 just as one can do for elliptic curves. For example a simple search found the curves in Table 1 , which all have subgroups of their Jacobians of`large' prime order; We could also use such a technique to generate curves over F p , where p is a small odd prime and look at the Jacobian over F p n . Apart from the, currently unimplemented, method of Schoof, Pila et al the above methods do not seem very pleasing. It is a good general principle never to choose a curve with`special structure', and all of the above s c hemes use`special' properties of the curves to make the group order computation easier.
To see why one should avoid special curves one only has to look at the history of elliptic curve cryptography. In the past various authors proposed using supersingular or anomalous curves as they o ered some advantages over other more general curves. However, both types of curves are now known to beweak, see 14 , 22 , 24 and 25 . Hence it is probably worth adopting the principle of always avoiding special curves of any shape or form. In the current authors opinion this is the major open problem with using hyperelliptic curves for cryptographic purposes: How to choose a suitable curve e ciently.
The discrete logarithm problem in hyperelliptic Jacobians
The security of hyperelliptic cryptosystems is based upon the di culty of solving the discrete logarithm problem in the Jacobian of the curve. We summarize the main characteristics of the possible attacks on the hyperelliptic discrete logarithm problem below. The reader should note that in all but one case they closely mirror analogues for the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
Apart from the generic discrete logarithm algorithms such as the babystep giant-step and the rho kangaroo method there are three known methods which are speci c to hyperelliptic curves. Two of these give rise to two weak classes of hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems:
1. Curves of order n over F q such that q l 1 mod n for some small value of n. This is due to a generalization of the method of Menezes et al 14 for supersingular elliptic curves due to Frey and R uck 9 . 2. Anomalous curves over F p and in general curves which have a large subgroup of order p in a eld of characteristic p. This attack uses a generalization due to R uck 21 of the anomalous curve attack for elliptic curves due to Semaev, Satoh, Araki and Smart, see 22 , 24 and 25 .
However, such cases are easy to check for and only eliminate a small fraction of all possible curves. For hyperelliptic curves the most interesting case, from a theoretical standpoint, is when the genus is large in comparison to the size of the eld of de nition of the Jacobian. In this case there are conjectured subexponential methods. The rst of these was due to Adleman, De Marrais and Huang which is based on the number eld sieve factoring method.
Paulus 17 and Flassenberg and Paulus 7 have implemented such a method for solving discrete logarithms in Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves. Flassenberg and Paulus did not, however, use the method of Adleman, De Marrais and Huang directly. Instead they made use of the fact that our hyperelliptic curves correspond to real quadratic function eld extensions. Then using the analogy between quadratic function elds and quadratic number elds they adapted the class group method of Hafner and McCurley 10 see also 5 . This combined, with a sieving operation, provided a working method which could be applied to hyperelliptic curves of small genus. It should be pointed out that although Flassenberg and Paulus did not actually solve discrete logarithm problems their methods are such that they can be easily extended so that they do.
Flassenberg and Paulus compared their algorithm to the baby-step giant-step approach. Over nite prime elds, F p , their implementation of the Hafner-McCurley method beat the baby-step giant-step method, as soon as 3g log p. However, this is only given a very small sample size. But it would appear, for theoretical reasons as well, to be a good rule of thumb to avoid curves for which 2g log q. Hence if q F 2 31 then we should avoid curves whose genus is larger than eleven.
Implementation
We implemented the group law in the Jacobian for curves of arbitrary genus over F 2 n and F p , where p is a prime. We decided to choose values of p and n such that p and 2 n are less than 2 32 . This choice was to make sure that our basic arithmetic could all be tted into single words on our computer. Such curves and elds have attracted some interest in the community in recent years since they may o er some implementation adavantages. In even characteristic we used a trinomial basis while in odd characteristic we used a small inlined machine code subroutine to perform the modular multiplication. Field inversion in both cases was carried out using a modi cation of the binary method.
The general multiplication algorithm on the Jacobian for curves de ned over odd characteristic elds ended up being around twice as slow as that for even characteristic elds, of an equivalent size, in genus two. In genus ve the odd characteristic elds were nearly three times slower. This fact led us to only implement a full digital signature scheme in characteristic two.
For the signing operation the multiplication performed is on the xed group generator. Hence this can be e ciently accomplished using a precomputed table of powers of the generator. The veri cation step requires two multiplications, one of the generator and one of a general point. Hence for veri cation we cannot use precomputed tables and the di culty of doubling an element will dominate the computation.
Our timings, in milliseconds, for a hyperelliptic variant of the DSA method HCDSA are given in Table 2 . These timings were obtained on a Pentium II 266MHz using the Visual C++ compiler. We also give an estimate of the timings for an elliptic curve ECDSA systems with approximately the same group order. So we see that even though the nite eld elements t into a single word the extra cost of the polynomial arithmetic needed for operations in the Jacobian make the time needed to perform the complete set of hyperelliptic curve operations around three times slower.
Of course further work could result in signi cant speed ups for hyperelliptic systems. For example at present there appears to be no notion akin to the projective representation in elliptic curves. Another possible avenue for improvement is to use Frobenius expansions. Not as much work has been carried out in the hyperelliptic case to the study of Frobenius expansions compared to the elliptic curve case. These are useful for curves de ned over small sub elds, such as those used above. The only cases having been considered in the hyperelliptic case are in 12 . However, for elliptic curves Frobenius expansions techniques can be made very fast in all characteristics, see 16 , 26 and 27 . 
